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This paper analyses the effect of federalism on fertility and growth. In a model with human 
capital accumulation and endogenous fertility, two regimes of education finance are 
compared: central and local education. Using numerical simulation, I find that local education 
finance yields higher growth at the price of increased inequality. Aggregate fertility may be 
lower or higher under federalism. Interestingly, the fertility differential is reversed: while 
under central finance, rich families have fewer children than poor ones (when the elasticity of 
substitution between children and consumption is large), the opposite may occur under local 
finance. The paper also tests the relationship between fertility rates and fiscal decentralisation 
empirically on a panel of OECD countries and finds a weak negative effect of decentralisation 
on total and differential (poor minus rich) fertility. 
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In most industrialised countries, fertility has been falling. While this decline, starting with
the industrial revolution, has been accompanied by unprecedented levels of growth, there
are now fears that further decreases in fertility will undermine social insurance systems and
lead to other detrimental economic outcomes. What is more, fertility is often much lower
for the skilled than the unskilled, that is, there is a fertility di®erential between rich and
poor. If this di®erential were to increase, further stress would be put on social insurance
systems.
Therefore, policies aimed at increasing fertility are on the agenda in most developed
countries. Examples include direct support to parents or child care subsidies as well as
public provision of child care and education. Since these policies also a®ect the incentives
of parents to invest in human capital, they have implications for growth as well as fertility.
In many countries, at least some of these policies are carried out by regional govern-
ments. For instance, in Germany, education is a regional government task while child care
is under the control of local governments (albeit subject to regulation from higher level
governments). The federal government has recently launched initiatives to increase the
availability of subsidised day care which, until now, is severely rationed. But what are the
e®ects of assigning such policies to higher or lower levels of government? Does decentral-
isation increase or decrease fertility? What are the e®ects on growth? These seem to be
important policy questions with no obvious answers.
This paper therefore attempts to analyse these questions within a growth framework
with endogenous fertility. In the model, parents care for the quantity and quality (i.e.
human capital) of their children. They decide on fertility levels, while the government
provides public education which a®ects the children's future human capital. The population
is heterogeneous with two groups di®erentiated by their initial human capital.
I then compare two regimes within this framework. Under centralised education, both
groups receive the same education level per capita. As a consequence, the human capital
levels of rich and poor children converge quickly. Under decentralised education ¯nance, I
assume that families sort into homogeneous jurisdictions, each providing their own public
education level ¯nanced by local taxes. Rich parents then provide better education for
their children, while poor parents will provide less education than under centralisation.
Using numerical simulation, I show that decentralisation results in higher average hu-
man capital but that human capital of rich and poor children diverge. Hence, there emerges
an equity-e±ciency trade-o®: faster growth versus higher inequality.
Diverging education levels a®ect fertility rates, and I ¯nd that, under some parameters,
decentralisation results in lower total fertility rates initially. While this is not in itself detri-
mental within the model considered, it may give some guidance to judge policies aimed at
increasing fertility. Apart from the e®ect on overall fertility, there is also a composition ef-
2fect. Since under decentralisation rich and poor have di®erent public policies and diverging
human capital levels, their fertility rates diverge as well. Moreover, while under centrali-
sation richer families have fewer children (assuming the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and children is large), this must no longer hold under decentralisation. In
fact, I ¯nd that under decentralisation the fertility di®erential may be reversed so that
richer parents have more children than poorer ones. This result is also partly responsible
for higher growth under federalism: since richer parents have more children, more weight
is put on the high human capital individuals and average human capital increases faster.
The paper also presents some empirical evidence on the link between decentralisation
and fertility. Using panel data from OECD countries, I examine whether ¯scal decentral-
isation has an e®ect on fertility rates. The results indicate that there is a negative e®ect
of decentralisation on total fertility. There is also some indicative evidence of a negative
e®ect on di®erential fertility, but this evidence is based on a small number of observations.
The paper is related to several recent contributions. de la Croix and Doepke (2004)
study the e®ect of public versus private education in a model with endogenous fertility.
They show that private education leads to higher balanced growth but diverging incomes;
however, growth may be lower with private education when the economy is not on the
balanced growth path. The same model is applied here to the distinction between central
and local education policy. There are, however, a few di®erences to their model, which will
be detailed below.
Several papers study local education policies in a dynamic context, but in contrast to the
present paper all abstract from endogenous fertility. Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) show
numerically that central education ¯nance leads to higher education spending and growth.
A similar approach is followed by Bearse et al. (2001). However, they ¯nd that centralised
school ¯nance decreases steady state per capita income. The di®erence is due to the
existence of private alternatives to public schools in their model. de la Croix and Montfort
(2000) and Tamura (2001) study growth and convergence with local education policies.
They show that regions may converge if there are local human capital spillovers (de la Croix
and Montfort, 2000) or if the human capital of teachers is the same in rich and poor districts
(Tamura, 2001). However, in the model with knowledge spillovers of de la Croix and
Montfort (2000), convergence with national education is faster than with regional education
since human capital spillovers attenuate with distance. See also Benabou (1996a,b) for
analyses of growth and convergence with regional education. Brueckner (2006) also studies
the connection between federalism and growth. He considers a two-region model like the
present one in an endogenous growth setting with constant population. He ¯nds that
by letting jurisdictions choose their preferred levels of infrastructure, federalism leads to
higher growth than a unitary system.
There is a relatively large empirical literature on the connection between federalism and
3growth, with somewhat controversial ¯ndings.1 Recent studies in this line of research have
found positive e®ects of decentralisation on growth. This paper uses similar indicators of
decentralisation to assess its impact on fertility. There is no study of which I am aware
that examines the e®ect of federalism on fertility empirically.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model setup. Section 3
describes the decentralised equilibrium, and Section 4 presents results from numerical sim-
ulations. Section 5 presents empirical evidence from a panel of OECD countries. Finally,
the last section concludes the paper.
2 The model
The basic model builds on de la Croix and Doepke (2004) but di®ers from their model in
two respects. Whereas they analyse private versus public education with uni¯ed policy, I
analyse purely public education with either central or local provision. Second, as much of
the literature, de la Croix and Doepke (2004) assume Cobb-Douglas preferences. This al-
lows for closed form solutions of all endogenous variables including tax rates and education
levels. However, Cobb-Douglas utility has the counterfactual implication that with public
education, all households choose the same fertility level and have the same preferred edu-
cation level. Instead, I assume a general CES utility function, which implies that there will
be di®erential fertility with public education and con°ict over optimal policies. There will
be some important implications for the fertility di®erential in particular under federalism.
However, this comes at the price of reduced tractability, since the model cannot be solved
analytically.
In the model, there are two groups of individuals, indexed by i = A;B. Time is discrete
and is indexed by t = 0;1;:::;1. The unit of analysis is the couple. In each period, couples
make decisions about consumption and fertility. They also vote on public education, which
bene¯ts their children through higher human capital when they become adults. Parents
di®er with respect to their human capital: There are P A
t parents of type A with human
capital hA
t , and P B
t parents of type B with human capital hB
t , where group A is the group
with lower initial human capital, hA
0 < hB
0 . I assume that the poor are in the majority
initially: P A
0 > P B
0 .
Adults of type i have preferences de¯ned over consumption, ci
t, and the number and
human capital of their children, ni
t and hi
t+1. The utility function is assumed to be of the













¾¡1; ° > 0:
1See, e.g., Davoodi and Zou (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), Xie et al. (1999), Iimi (2005), Thie¼en
(2003) and Stansel (2005).
4With ¾ ! 1, the utility function becomes the Coub-Douglas function analysed by de la
Croix and Doepke (2004) and many others.
Raising one child takes Á units of parents' time. The market wage is unity (production
is assumed to be linear), and wage income is taxed at rate ¿t. Hence, the budget constraint
of a couple of type i is
c
i





There is a unique consumption good produced with labour only. The production func-
tion is:
Yt = Lt;
where aggregate labour supply is given by
Lt = P
A











Children's future human capital is determined by public education spending (et), parental










where ¹ > 0 and ´;¯ 2 (0;1). Part of parents' human capital is transmitted to children
{ either through genetic inheritance or education at home. However, there are decreasing
returns to parental human capital, while all children bene¯t from public education and
from average human capital in society. An important implication is that with centralised
public education human capital levels will converge over time.
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The following sequence of events is assumed within each period. At the ¯rst stage, all
parents vote on the tax rate and public education level. The decision is taken by simple
majority so the preferences of the more numerous group prevail. As long the poor have
more children than the rich, the poor will be in the majority. At the second stage, parents
take decisions on consumption and fertility. As usual, the game is solved by backward
induction.
At stage two, parents maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (1) and the






















5Table 1: Comparative statics of fertility and optimal tax rates









Equation (4) shows how human capital determines fertility, for given public education.
Di®erentiation shows that fertility increases with income when ¾ < 1 and decreases with
income when ¾ > 1.2 On the one hand, richer parents will want more children, since the
demand for children increases with income. On the other hand, raising children takes time;
therefore, since richer parents have a higher opportunity cost of time, the cost of children
is higher the higher parents' human capital. Since the income elasticity of demand is one
with CES utility, the ¯rst e®ect will dominate if ¾ is lower than one, and richer parents
will have more children. Conversely, when ¾ > 1, the price e®ect dominates and richer
parents will have fewer children.
Fertility is also shaped by the tax rate and public education level. A higher tax rate,
has income and price e®ects opposite to those of an increase in income: While a higher tax
rate decreases the opportunity cost of raising children, which tends to increase fertility, it
also reduces net income which works towards lower fertility. The price e®ect will dominate
and, hence, a higher tax rate will increase fertility if the elasticity of substitution is larger
than one. Conversely, when ¾ < 1 a higher tax rate decreases fertility. The comparative
statics of fertility are summarised in Table 1.
Better public education increases children's human capital. For given fertility rate, the
utility of a given number of children increases. When consumption and children (or better,
children of a certain human capital level) are close substitutes (¾ > 1), the household
will decrease consumption, which for given net income means fertility must increase. Con-
versely, when consumption and children are complementary (in the sense that ¾ < 1), the
household will want to increase consumption which can be accomplished only by decreasing
fertility.
Consider now the choice of education spending. The government budget constraint













t (1 ¡ Án
A




t (1 ¡ Án
B
t )): (5)
2This holds under the assumption that children's human capital increases less than one-for-one with
parental human capital, i.e. ¯ < 1.
6Each couple then votes for the tax rate and spending level to maximise indirect utility,
subject to (2) and (5).
How does initial human capital a®ect a family's optimal tax rate? First, higher income
means that parents will want a better education for their children since they care about
quantity and quality of children and children's human capital is normal in the utility
function. Second, however, higher income means that the tax price of public education
rises because of the proportional income tax. Again, when the elasticity of substitution
is less than one, the income e®ect dominates and richer parents prefer higher tax rates.
Conversely, with ¾ > 1 the price e®ect dominates and richer parents prefer lower taxes.
The decisive voter is always a poor voter, at least when ¾ > 1, since then fertility for
the poor is higher than for the rich, so the poor will always be in the majority. When
¾ < 1, the rich have more children, which opens up the possibility that they may at some
point outnumber the poor. In the numerical simulation below, I check by hand that the
poor stay in the majority even when rich fertility rates are higher.
An intertemporal equilibrium is de¯ned as follows.
De¯nition 1 An equilibrium under central education ¯nance consists of a sequence of
aggregate quantities f¹ ht;Ltg, group sizes fP i
tgi=A;B, private decision rules fci
t;ni
tgi=A;B,
and policy variables f¿t;etg, such that
(i) households maximise utility subject to their budget constraint and the human capital
technology,
(ii) the government budget is balanced, and
(iii) the policy variables maximise the utility of the decisive voter, given the government
budget constraint.
It can now be shown how human capital levels evolve over time. The following result,
based on de la Croix and Doepke (2004), is proved in Appendix A:
Proposition 1 Under central education ¯nance, there is a balanced growth path where
xA
t = xB
t = 1 and nA
t = nB
t , i.e. inequality in human capital and fertility has vanished.
The intuition is straightforward. All individuals receive the same education and bene¯t
from average national human capital. Since children's human capital increases less than
proportionately with parental human capital, this implies that human capital levels { and,
therefore also fertility levels { must converge.
3 Decentralised equilibrium
Consider now what happens when the provision of education is decentralised to local gov-
ernments, and individuals are mobile so they can choose their place of residence. Assume
7that the country is made up of two regions. Since individuals are heterogeneous, an imme-
diate conjecture is that they will sort into homogeneous jurisdictions, one inhabited by the
rich and the other by the poor, and indeed, I will assume this to be the case. Note, however,
that this outcome may necessitate that jurisdictions can control migration, either directly
or indirectly (for instance through zoning). If this were not the case, the poor might prefer
to live in the rich jurisdiction where average human capital is high. The determination of
equilibrium would become much more involved, since a strati¯ed equilibrium would exist
only if it is incentive compatible. Another interpretation might of course be to look at
two regions which di®er by their human capital endowments where there is no migration
between regions.
There are two other features worthy to note. First, the assumption that central edu-
cation implies identical education quality per capita is obviously unrealistic. For instance,
even though spending per capita might be identical, the quality of education would di®er
between groups if the rich and poor do not live in the same areas and use di®erent public
schools, due for instance to the existence of peer e®ects. Therefore, even with identical
spending levels per capita, able or rich students generally receive a better quality edu-
cation than poor or less able students. Second, the assumption of perfect sorting under
local school ¯nance is obviously just as unrealistic for many reasons, for instance, because
parents di®er by income, abilities, preferences for having children, and so on. However,
the important point is that central ¯nance leads to a more equal distribution of education
quality than local ¯nance, which is easy to reconcile with empirical evidence.
An equilibrium under local education will be de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 2 An equilibrium under local education ¯nance consists of two regions popu-
lated by homogeneous individuals of type i 2 fA;Bg such that within each jurisdiction an
intertemporal equilibrium as de¯ned in De¯nition 1 obtains.
Within each jurisdiction, the determination of the equilibrium then proceeds just like
described in the previous section. The only di®erence is that there is no more heterogeneity
within each jurisdiction, i.e. within jurisdiction i, ¹ hi
t = hi
t. This implies that the individual































t is given by (4). To some extent, each group then behaves as if they provided
private education to themselves.3;4
3There is a subtle di®erence to perfectly private education. With private education as modeled by
de la Croix and Doepke (2004), parents decide on fertility and education simultaneously, while with public
education, parents decide on fertility once education is ¯xed. Therefore, the quantity-quality tradeo®
which parents face under private education when deciding on fertility does not exist at this stage under
public education.
4de la Croix and Doepke (2004) model the choice of public versus private education in the same model
8While the problem in (6) cannot be solved analytically, it is easy to see that the rich
jurisdiction will spend more on education than the poor jurisdiction, since education is a
normal good. But this implies xA
t+1 < xA
t for all t. Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under local education ¯nance, there is no convergence of income across
regions. In fact, xA
t converges to zero.
The fact that income levels do not converge is due to the absence of human capital
spillovers between regions. When such spillovers are present, human capital levels would
still converge under local ¯nance, albeit a slower pace than under central ¯nance (de la
Croix and Montfort, 2000). It would then also be possible to obtain faster growth under
central ¯nance.5
Before looking at the results of numerical simulations, it may be useful to present some
general thoughts on the e®ect of decentralisation on fertility and growth. The central
question is how taxes and spending evolve under local compared to central education. The
result that the rich choose higher education than the poor under local ¯nance is independent
of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution. The e®ect of decentralisation on the tax
rate, on the other hand, depends on whether ¾ is smaller or larger than one.
Suppose ¾ > 1. For the poor, decentralisation reduces the average tax base (the rich
have left), which means that the tax price of public education rises. This implies that the
optimal tax rate falls and with it, the public education level. Conversely, for the rich, the
tax base increases which implies a higher optimal tax rate and more education spending.
What are the e®ects on fertility and human capital? For the poor, since the tax rate
and public education level fall, fertility decreases relative to central education. Conversely,
for the rich, fertility increases. In fact, the simulation in the next section shows that the
ranking of fertility levels may be reversed: Whereas under centralisation rich parents have
fewer children, under decentralisation they may have more children than poor parents. As
for human capital, since the poor will receive less education under decentralisation and the
rich more, human capital levels will not converge (see Prop. 2).
When ¾ < 1, the e®ects go partly in the opposite direction. Under decentralisation,
the poor will want a higher tax rate, while the education level will still decrease. The
e®ect on fertility is thus a priori unclear. For the rich, the optimal tax level falls under
decentralisation and the public education level rises. Again, the e®ect on rich fertility is
ambiguous. However, in this case as well, the human capital levels of rich and poor will
with only one national education policy. However, in their model, individuals' human capital is a®ected
by average national human capital ¹ ht, whereas here it is assumed to depend on average regional human
capital ¹ hi
t. Their assumption would correspond to a model with human capital spillovers between regions
as in de la Croix and Montfort (2000).
5de la Croix and Doepke (2004) show that public education may lead to faster growth than private
education (o® the balanced growth path) depending on income inequality.











Figure 1: Average human capital under central (solid lines) and local (dashed lines) edu-
cation
not converge under decentralisation, as shown in Prop. 2.
In the next section, I present numerical simulation results to illustrate the e®ects of
decentralisation on fertility and growth. The simulation also allows to analyse the dynamics
of fertility and human capital accumulation under di®erent regimes.
4 Simulation
4.1 Benchmark results
This section presents results from numerical simulations. I use the following benchmark
parameter values: ¹ = 0:75;´ = 0:6;° = 0:15;Á = 0:12;¯ = 0:22, and ¾ = 1:11. Initial
population sizes are P A
1 = 90;P B
1 = 45 and human capital levels hA
1 = 38;hB
1 = 100. While
this section is not intended to replicate speci¯c values of fertility or growth for any speci¯c
time and country, the values chosen correspond roughly to those used in de la Croix and
Doepke (2004).
In the ¯rst period, fertility levels under central education are nA
1 = 1:21 and nB
1 = 1:13,
so a poor family has 2.42 children on average and a rich family 2.26. The equilibrium
tax rate is ¿1 = 0:0866 or 8.7%, and education spending per capita e1 = 3:69. Under
local ¯nance, fertility rates in the ¯rst period are nA
1 = 1:15 and nB
1 = 1:21, tax rates
¿A
1 = 0:0822;¿B
1 = 0:0871 and education spending gA
1 = 2:35 and gB
1 = 6:15. Next, I
describe the evolution of key variables over the ¯rst ¯ve periods.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of average human capital under the central and local
regimes. As the ¯gure shows, decentralisation yields higher growth of average human








Figure 2: Relative human capital of the poor under central (solid lines) and local (dashed
lines) education
capital. This mirrors the ¯ndings of Brueckner (2006). The ¯nding can also be contrasted
to de la Croix and Doepke (2004) who ¯nd that { o® the balanced growth path { growth
may be higher with public than private education (when income inequality is large), the
reason being that private education implies that the poor substitute out of child quality into
child quantity. This implies that more weight gets put on low human capital individuals
in the determination of average human capital. In the present setting, decentralisation
has somewhat di®erent e®ects than private education in de la Croix and Doepke (2004).
In particular, the rich will have more children than the poor and, consequently, average
human capital rises much faster than under centralisation. The main di®erence is that
with private education, the rich substitute out of child quantity into quality.
As Figure 2 shows, the higher growth under local education comes at the price of
dramatically increased inequality. The ¯gure displays the relative human capital of the
poor, xA
t . Under centralisation, human capital levels for rich and poor converge rather
quickly, while under local education, relative human capital of the poor falls towards zero.
Finally, Figure 3 displays fertility levels under centralisation and decentralisation. Here
dark lines refer to fertility levels of the poor and gray lines to the rich (both solid under
centralisation, dashed under decentralisation). Note that decentralisation reverses the
ranking of fertility levels: Under decentralisation, the rich have more and the poor fewer
children than under centralisation { at least after the second period. Total fertility is,
however, rather similar under both regimes. Figure 4 displays total fertility rates under
centralisation and decentralisation. As the Figure shows, total fertility under centralisation
is a bit larger than under decentralisation for the ¯rst four periods. Thus, decentralisation
seems to a®ect the composition of fertility among di®erent population classes more than









Figure 3: Fertility levels of the poor (dark lines) and rich (gray lines) under central (solid
lines) and local (dashed lines) education
the total fertility level. Also, under centralisation, fertility levels converge (since human
capital levels converge) while under decentralisation there is slight divergence of fertility
levels.
4.2 Welfare and policy implications
In this section I brie°y discuss implications for welfare and policy. What would a good
policy do? Clearly this depends on the policy objective. A large part of the debates about
family policy seem to be motivated by a political desire to increase fertility. The results
from the last section indicate that decentralisation of education or childcare policies might
have only small overall e®ects on fertility. However, the composition of fertility among
di®erent population segments is likely to change. In Section 5, I will look at OECD data
to see whether one can discern any e®ects of decentralisation on fertility rates.
Even if fertility were una®ected by decentralisation, however, there is a clear impact
on growth of human capital which is important for policymakers. As in Brueckner (2006),
it turns out from the benchmark simulation that federalism increases the growth rate of
average human capital. However, the human capital of the poor was shown to decrease
relative to centralisation. Hence, there seems to be a classic con°ict between e±ciency and
equity. Which regime is preferred then depends on the weighting of the welfare of the two
groups. With variable population there is no obvious way to aggregate welfare, but it is
clear that centralisation is likely to be more favourable when the weight on the poor in the
social welfare function is large. For instance, suppose that the social welfare function is a








Figure 4: Total fertility rates under central and local education
weighted average of a representative poor and a representative rich agent:6
Wt = ®u
A
t + (1 ¡ ®)u
B
t :
Taking ® = 0:5, decentralisation clearly dominates centralisation. The reason is that the
rich obtain a welfare gain from decentralisation which is so large that it easily outweighs
the loss to the poor. However, when ® = 0:85, decentralisation becomes the dominant
alternative in the ¯rst three periods, as shown in Figure 5.
4.3 The case of ¾ < 1
In this subsection, I brie°y consider what happens when the elasticity of substitution is
less than one. With all other parameters as in the benchmark simulation, I set ¾ = 0:9.
Note that the rich now have higher fertility than the poor under central education. It then
becomes a possibility that the rich will in some period be in the majority. In the example,
this possibility is ruled out if the relative number of the poor is high enough to begin with.
The result on average and relative human capital is very similar to that with a larger
¾: higher growth and more inequality with decentralised education ¯nance. The reason for
higher growth, however, is somewhat di®erent, and the e®ects turn on the very di®erent
implications for di®erential fertility.
6Other possibilities would be the Benthamite welfare function of total utility or the Millian welfare
function of average utility. In the present example, the ¯rst would tend to favour centralisation and the
second decentralisation. (The picture for the Millian objective function would look similar to Figure 5 for
a somewhat higher level of ®.)








Figure 5: Welfare under central (solid lines) and local (dashed lines) education
Figure 6 shows fertility levels for rich and poor under the two regimes. Under central
education, the rich have more children than the poor. However, this is reversed under local
education where the poor have higher fertility rates. This is due to the fact that the rich
again have higher education levels than the poor under local education. However, they
now respond by reducing fertility, whereas with ¾ > 1 fertility rises with better public
education.
Average human capital still rises more under decentralisation than under centralisation
even though the rich now have fewer children and more weight is consequently put on
the poor. However, since demand for education by the rich under decentralisation now
increases much more, so does their human capital, and as a result, average human capital.
Figure 7 shows that under both central and local education total fertility decreases over
time, but it is somewhat higher under decentralisation: the rich have fewer children than
under central ¯nance but this is more than outweighed by the fact that the poor have more
children.
5 Empirical evidence
In this section I present some empirical evidence on the link between federalism and fertility.
According to the model, one would expect di®erential fertility to fall with decentralisation if
the elasticity of substitution is large. The e®ect on total fertility is theoretically ambiguous
(even if we know the value of ¾). Since theory had no clear prediction on the link between
federalism and fertility, it is of interest to see what the data say. I ¯rst look at total fertility
rates and then at di®erential fertility.






Figure 6: Fertility levels of the poor and rich under central and local education when ¾ < 1









































Figure 8: Fertility rates across time for selected OECD countries
5.1 Total fertility
I use panel data for OECD countries to see whether decentralisation a®ects total fertility.
Data were obtained from the OECD and from Gauthier (2003) and Gauthier and Bortnik
(2004) (see Appendix B for details).
The basic estimation equation is
lnTFRit = Xit¯ + ± lnDECit + ºit; (7)
where TFR is the total fertility rate in country i at time t, X is a vector of controls, DEC
is the measure of decentralisation, and º is an error term. Estimation will be based on
¯xed e®ects regression to account for unmeasured country-speci¯c heterogeneity. I also
will include year dummies to include any change related to unmeasured variables which
vary over time.
The evolution of fertility for selected countries is displayed in Figure 8. This shows the
well known decline in fertility rates over the last decades.
As independent variables, I include a number of controls commonly used in the liter-
ature (e.g. Adsera, 2004; D'Addio and Mira d'Ercole, 2005): log GDP per capita, total
unemployment rate, weeks of maternity leave, maternity leave pay (as percent of women's
wages in manufacturing), child care weeks and pay, log index of female wages, log index of
male wages, female labour force participation, and family allowance for ¯rst, second and
third child. Summary statistics are displayed in Table 2.
16Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Total fertility rate 1.967 0.771 1029
Di®erential fertility rate 0.423 0.278 25
Tax decentralisation 19.218 16.68 753
Expenditure decentralisation 31.296 12.756 674
Education decentralisation 55.842 28.421 460
Social protection decentralisation 16.486 13.463 459
Unemployment rate 6.845 3.813 745
gdppc 16776.795 8980.989 967
Maternity leave 15.804 11.725 662
Maternity pay 63.629 35.819 662
Child care leave 32.497 48.23 662
Child care pay 4.594 13.438 588
Wage gap 0.724 0.096 638
Female labour force participation 54.83 12.139 659
Family allowance 1st child 4.289 15.04 657
Family allowance 2nd child 6.773 23.774 657
Family allowance 3rd child 6.541 16.266 657
GDP is a proxy for income and should have a negative e®ect on fertility if the elasticity
of substitution between consumption and (quality weighted) children is larger than one.
Female wages should also have a negative e®ect on fertility if ¾ > 1. Maternity leave
policies may have positive or negative e®ects on fertility: on the one hand, generous leave
policies make it easier for mothers to return to their job, while on the other hand, very long
leave may reduce women's wages which might make childbearing less attractive. Previous
work, however, has found that generous leave policies have a positive impact on fertility
(Adsera, 2004; Lalive and ZweimÄ uller, 2005). Unemployment has previously been found
to have a negative e®ect on fertility. Although temporary unemployment may make child-
bearing cheap, persistent unemployment has income and risk e®ects which are expected to
decrease fertility (Adsera, 2004). While high female labour force participation used to be
associated with low fertility, the cross country correlation between fertility and labour force
participation has recently turned positive (e.g. Adsera, 2004; D'Addio and Mira d'Ercole,
2005).
In measuring decentralisation, a number of well known concerns arise. One method is
to use some sort of constitutional variable, i.e., what kind of responsibilities are constitu-
tionally assigned to upper and lower level governments. The drawback of this approach is,
however, that it has limited variation within countries and also misses a lot of important
17variation within the constitutional assignment.
The other { and usually followed { approach in the literature is to use the realised
decentralisation of government expenditures or revenues. While this allows for a lot more
variation, it also begs the question what is actually being measured (see Stegarescu, 2005,
for an overview). For instance, by the usual measure for tax decentralisation { the share of
total tax revenue accruing to sub-national governments { Germany is rather decentralised,
while in fact, the lower level governments have no independent taxing power and receive
most of their revenue from shared tax sources.
To remedy this, Stegarescu (2005) constructs a measure of tax decentralisation that
takes into account the tax raising power of the subnational governments, based on work
done by the OECD. The measure used here is constructed as follows:7
TAXDEC =
Subcentral govt own tax revenue
General govt. total tax revenue
; (8)
(9)
where own taxes refers to those where subcentral governments can determine either the
tax rate or the tax base or both. Thus, shared taxes where subcentral governments have
at best partial control of tax rates and based are excluded from this measure.
I also use data on expenditure decentralisation from the IMF Government Finance
Statistics. Unfortunately, there is as of now no measure which would take account of
jurisdictions' power to autonomously determine expenditure, but nonetheless, the hope
is that these indicators are correlated with decentralisation of real spending power. In
addition to total expenditure, the IMF statistics also record expenditures by function. I
therefore use three expenditure based decentralisation measures:
EXPDEC =
Subcentral govt own expenditure
General govt. total expenditure
(10)
EDDEC =
Subcentral govt education expenditure
General govt. education expenditure
(11)
SOCDEC =
Subcentral govt social protection expenditure
General govt. social protection expenditure
: (12)
(13)
The theoretical part focused on education spending, so this measure might be most
closely linked to the model. However, other spending items will impact on fertility as well,
and this will most likely be the case for social spending, so this measure is included here
as well.
7Stegarescu (2005) analyses trends in decentralisation over time and argues that both his adjusted and



































Figure 9: Tax decentralisation across time for selected OECD countries
Therefore, four decentralisation measures are used in the empirical analysis. There
may be arguments for using revenue or expenditure variables. The tax variable has the
advantage of capturing real autonomy on the part of subcentral governments. On the other
hand, in some countries such as Germany, lower level governments have very limited tax
autonomy but may still in°uence policies by their spending decisions. Hence, we use all of
these variables here to see which one works best.
The evolution of the decentralisation measure for selected countries is displayed in
Figure 9. As Stegarescu (2005) shows, there is a marked trend of decentralisation for several
countries, notably Belgium and Spain, but also Canada, France, Italy, Denmark, Portugal
and Greece. Hence, there is some variation of ¯scal decentralisation across countries and
time, which makes panel estimation possible.
The regression results are displayed in Table 3.
Looking at the table, the ¯ndings can be summarised as follows. Variables that posi-
tively a®ect fertility are the length of maternity leave, female labour force participation and
family allowance for the ¯rst child. The positive e®ect of female labour force participation
has recently been found in a number of other empirical studies. Unemployment, GDP per
capita, and family allowance for the third child seem to have a negative impact on fertility.
For the other parameters, the results do not seem to show a clear pattern.
Looking at the decentralisation measures, the coe±cient for tax decentralisation is neg-
ative and is signi¯cant at 1%. This result gives some indication that ¯scal decentralisation
may have a negative e®ect on fertility. The estimated elasticity of -0.03 is, however, rel-
19Table 3: Regression results (Total fertility rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log tax decentralisation -0.031
(2.35)¤
Log expenditure decentralisation -0.325
(4.75)¤¤
Log education decentralisation -0.077
(3.57)¤¤
Log social protection decentralisation 0.196
(2.91)¤¤
Unemployment rate -0.018 -0.022 -0.009 -0.009
(4.96)¤¤ (4.38)¤¤ (1.19) (1.07)
Log GDP per capita -0.26 -0.795 -1.042 -0.839
(2.01)¤ (5.04)¤¤ (3.96)¤¤ (3.17)¤¤
Maternity leave 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.007
(10.34)¤¤ (5.02)¤¤ (4.59)¤¤ (3.64)¤¤
Maternity pay -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.004
(1.84)y (1.29) (1.1) (1.23)
Child care leave -0.001 0 0.002 0.002
(1.85)y (0.88) (2.33)¤ (2.10)¤
Child care pay 0.002 0.002 0.001 0
(4.72)¤¤ (2.28)¤ (0.69) (0.55)
Log female wage 0.486 -0.058 -0.708 -0.708
(2.71)¤¤ (0.2) (0.88) (0.85)
Log male wage -0.517 -0.151 0.277 0.237
(3.45)¤¤ (0.65) (0.45) (0.38)
Female labour force participation 0.007 0.016 0.017 0.02
(3.50)¤¤ (2.94)¤¤ (2.07)¤ (2.21)¤
Family allowance 1st child 0.008 0.046 0.077 0.06
(2.74)¤¤ (2.82)¤¤ (3.72)¤¤ (2.89)¤¤
Family allowance 2nd child -0.001 0.072 0.054 0.04
(4.16)¤¤ (2.87)¤¤ (1.56) (1.12)
Family allowance 3rd child -0.006 -0.118 -0.131 -0.1
(2.22)¤ (4.11)¤¤ (2.95)¤¤ (2.14)¤
Constant 2.784 8.113 7.958 6.415
(2.07)¤ (5.31)¤¤ (3.58)¤¤ (2.84)¤¤
Observations 424 299 197 197
R-squared 0.44 0.41 0.54 0.52
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Country ¯xed e®ects and year dummies included.
y signi¯cant at 10%; ¤ signi¯cant at 5%; ¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%
20atively small. It implies that a one-standard-deviation increase (16.68 percentage points)
of tax decentralisation would decrease the total fertility rate by 0.02. While the standard
deviation is large relative to the sample mean of 19.21, it may be noted that this sort
of increase has been realised by Belgium, France and Spain over the period of 1970-2001
(Stegarescu, 2005).
The expenditure decentralisation variable also has a negative and highly signi¯cant
coe±cient. Moreover, expenditure decentralisation seems to have a more sizeable e®ect on
fertility, with an estimated elasticity of -0.33. This implies that a one standard-deviation
increase in expenditure decentralisation could reduce total fertility from the mean of 1.97
to 1.76. Interestingly, the same pattern holds for decentralisation of education spending:
according to the estimates shown in column (3), the e®ect is again negative and signi¯cant
at 1%. On the other hand, decentralising social protection seems to have a positive impact
on fertility. It would be interesting to build a model which encompasses some element of
social spending to see whether this ¯nding is consistent with the proposed framework.
In summary, there seems to be some evidence that total fertility falls with the degree of
¯scal decentralisation. While the e®ect of tax decentralisation seems to be small, expendi-
ture decentralisation seems to have more sizeable e®ects. It would obviously be desirable
to delve somewhat deeper into these ¯ndings. In particular, it would be interesting to look
at expenditure measures that show the real degree of autonomy of lower levels of govern-
ment for di®erent spending categories. Since these measures do not yet exist, however, the
analysis here is con¯ned to conventional measures of expenditure decentralisation.
5.2 Di®erential fertility
Comparable international data on di®erential fertility are much harder to come by. One
possibility would be to use household surveys, but those that are comparable across coun-
tries generally do not contain enough observations to construct reliable statistics.
Here, I follow de la Croix and Doepke (2007) and use data from the OECD PISA
study on student achievement (PISA 2000). The study contains information on 15-year
old students and their family backgrounds. In particular, it asks students on the number of
siblings and it records the socioeconomic status of the student's father in four categories.
The measure of di®erential fertility used here is then the di®erence in average family size
between students of the lowest status minus that of those with the highest status.
Since this is only a cross section of countries for the year 2000, the results are at best
indicative since the sample size is very small. Nonetheless, Table 4 shows the results of
regressing log di®erential fertility on the decentralisation measures, log GDP, and length of
maternity leave. As the Table shows, all decentralisation indicators have a negative e®ect
on di®erential fertility. For two of them the coe±cient is signi¯cant at 10% { and almost
5 % (the p-values are 0.057 for expenditure decentralisation and 0.062 for educational
21Table 4: Regression results (di®erential fertility)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log tax decentralisation -0.176
(1.39)
Log expenditure decentralisation -0.632
(2.08)y
Log education decentralisation -0.399
(2.07)y
Log social protection decentralisation -0.257
(1.70)
Log GDP per capita 0.668 1.255 1.526 1.826
(1.29) (2.22)¤ (2.53)¤ (2.29)¤
Maternity leave -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008
(1.08) (1.06) (1.10) (0.74)
Constant -7.185 -11.41 -14.857 -18.847
(1.44) (2.29)¤ (2.64)¤ (2.44)¤
Observations 19 18 15 15
R-squared 0.18 0.29 0.4 0.33
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
y signi¯cant at 10%; ¤ signi¯cant at 5%; ¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%
decentralisation). This shows that decentralisation may have e®ects on di®erential as well
as total fertility. Obviously, more research is needed to establish whether this relation
holds up with better data.
6 Conclusion
The paper has presented a model to analyse the decentralisation of policies { such as
education and child care { which simultaneously a®ect fertility and growth. Although such
policies are widely debated in industrialised countries due to the decline in fertility, not
much seems to be known about the e®ects of decentralising policy on fertility and the
interaction between fertility and growth.
The main results can be summarised as follows. In the benchmark model, decentralisa-
tion leads to higher growth of human capital with greatly increased inequality. While total
fertility is not strongly a®ected, the distribution of fertility between rich and poor is, and in
particular, the ranking of fertility rates is reversed (with a large elasticity of substitution).
Whereas in the centralised system the poor have more children, in the decentralised system
they have fewer children than the rich. This is an interesting observation. In particular, it
22implies that whether richer families have more or less children depends on the institutional
setting of family policy, including whether it is carried out by central or local governments.
For policy purposes, there emerges a trade-o® between growth maximising and equality
preserving policies. The paper also has shown that depending on parameters, decentrali-
sation may lead to higher or lower fertility than centralisation.
The paper has also presented ¯rst evidence on the link between ¯scal decentralisation
and fertility. The evidence shows that decentralisation seems to have a negative e®ect
on total fertility. For tax decentralisation, this e®ect seems to be small. Expenditure
decentralisation, on the other hand, seems to have more economically important e®ects.
The ¯nding that decentralisation a®ects fertility should be important for policy makers
attempting to increase fertility in the wake of demographic pressure on the welfare states.
The paper has also presented some evidence that di®erential fertility { i.e. the di®erence
in fertility rates between poor and rich families { decreases with decentralisation, which is
consistent with the model. It also highlights the importance of a disaggregated view on
fertility. While a look at aggregate fertility might lead to the conclusion that decentral-
isation erodes the basis of pay-as-you-go pension systems, this view might be somewhat
misleading. Indeed, if centralisation reduces the fertility di®erential, this may be good
news from the point of sustainability of social security.
Finally, there are some issues with the data which point toward the need for further
research. First, data on subcentral government spending do not as yet allow any inference
on the extent of decision making authority. And second, there are only very limited data
available on di®erential fertility. Therefore, if one is interested in these questions, collecting
better data seems to be of high priority.
23Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows de la Croix and Doepke (2004). From the human capital production
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The dynamics in (A.4) show that there are two steady states, xA
t = 0 and xA
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the ¯xed point at 0 is locally unstable and the ¯xed point at 1 is globally stable. ¥
B Data sources
Fertility rates are from OECD (2006). Di®erential fertility comes from the OECD PISA
database and is taken from de la Croix and Doepke (2007).
The index for tax decentralisation is from Stegarescu (2005), and the indices for ex-
penditure decentralisation are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks
(1972-2006).
GDP and standardised unemployment rates are from the OECD National Accounts
(various years).
24Maternity bene¯ts and pay, child care bene¯ts and pay were compiled by Gauthier
and Bortnik (2004) from various international sources. Family allowance, indices of male
and female wages as well as female labour force participation were taken from Gauthier
(2003): family allowances are from United States, Social Security Programs Throughout the
World(various years); male and female wages are from International Labor O±ce, Year
Book of Labor Statistics (various years) and additional country-speci¯c sources; female
labour force participation from OECD, OECD Historical Statistics (various issues).
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